

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Sarah Jordan

C/A No. 3:21-cv-683-JFA-PJG

Plaintiff,

vs.

**ORDER**C. Glenn Day; Harville Spence; Doyle  
Collind; White Rock Baptist Church,  
Defendants.**I. INTRODUCTION**

The *pro se* plaintiff, Sarah Jordan, brings this civil action. Plaintiff filed this action in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the case was referred to the Magistrate Judge for initial review.

After reviewing the complaint, the Magistrate Judge assigned to this action<sup>1</sup> prepared a thorough Report and Recommendation (“Report”). (ECF No. 9). Within the Report, the Magistrate Judge opines that this court should dismiss the complaint without issuance and service of process for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

The Report sets forth, in detail, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and this Court incorporates those facts and standards without a recitation.

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<sup>1</sup> The Magistrate Judge’s review is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.). The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. *Mathews v. Weber*, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).

Plaintiff was advised of her right to object to the Report, which was entered on the docket on March 17, 2021. *Id.* Plaintiff filed objections to the Report on April 1, 2021. (ECF No. 15). Thus, this matter is ripe for review.

## II. LEGAL STANDARD

The court is charged with making a *de novo* determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objections are made, and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court is only required to conduct a *de novo* review of the specific portions of the Magistrate Judge's Report to which an objection is made. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); *Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. & Parole*, 974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific objections to portions of the Report of the Magistrate, this court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the recommendation. *See Camby v. Davis*, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983). Thus, the court must only review those portions of the Report to which Petitioner has made a specific written objection. *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310, 316 (4th Cir. 2005).

“An objection is specific if it ‘enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.’” *Dunlap v. TM Trucking of the Carolinas, LLC*, No. 0:15-cv-04009-JMC, 2017 WL 6345402, at \*5 n.6 (D.S.C. Dec. 12, 2017) (citing *One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121 E. 30th St.*, 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)). A specific objection to the Magistrate Judge’s Report

thus requires more than a reassertion of arguments from the complaint or a mere citation to legal authorities. *See Workman v. Perry*, No. 6:17-cv-00765-RBH, 2017 WL 4791150, at \*1 (D.S.C. Oct. 23, 2017). A specific objection must “direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and recommendations.” *Orpiano v. Johnson*, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).

“Generally stated, nonspecific objections have the same effect as would a failure to object.” *Staley v. Norton*, No. 9:07-0288-PMD, 2007 WL 821181, at \*1 (D.S.C. Mar. 2, 2007) (citing *Howard v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs.*, 932 F.2d 505, 509 (6th Cir. 1991)). The court reviews portions “not objected to—including those portions to which only ‘general and conclusory’ objections have been made—for *clear error*.” *Id.* (emphasis added) (citing *Diamond*, 416 F.3d at 315; *Camby*, 718 F.2d at 200; *Orpiano*, 687 F.2d at 47).

Because Plaintiff is proceeding *pro se*, the court is charged with liberally construing the pleadings to allow Plaintiff to fully develop potentially meritorious cases. *See Cruz v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990).

### III. DISCUSSION

As stated above, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter have been incorporated from the Report. Within the Report, the Magistrate Judge recommends Plaintiff’s claims be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

As an initial matter, Plaintiff does not appear to contest that there is no diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332 and therefore that conclusion is adopted without objection.

Instead, Plaintiff's objections take issue with the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that this court lacks federal question jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In support of this contention, Plaintiff avers for the first time that Defendant White Rock Baptist Church has violated her First Amendment right to freedom of religion by prohibiting her attendance.

Plaintiff's objections appear to assert a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which allows a plaintiff to assert a claim against any person who, acting under color of state law, "subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "Section 1983 is not itself a source of substantive rights, but merely provides a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred." *Albright v. Oliver*, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994)(internal quotations omitted).


Here, Plaintiff avers that her First Amendment rights were violated. However, she fails to offer any allegations showing that any of the Defendants acted under color of state law. "To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must show that the alleged constitutional deprivation at issue occurred because of action taken by the defendant 'under color of ... state law.' " *Davison v. Randall*, 912 F.3d 666, 679 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Philips v. Pitt Cty. Mem'l Hosp.*, 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009)). Thus, even if the

complaint had alleged a violation of First Amendment rights, Plaintiff's claims would still be subject to dismissal pursuant to § 1915<sup>2</sup> as her complaint fails to state a viable cause of action. Thus, Plaintiff's objections are without merit and must be overruled.

#### **IV. CONCLUSION**

After carefully reviewing the applicable laws, the record in this case, the Report and Recommendation, and the objections thereto, this Court finds the Magistrate Judge's recommendation fairly and accurately summarizes the facts and applies the correct principles of law. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report (ECF No. 9). Thus, Plaintiff's claims are summarily dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.

IT IS SO ORDERED.



April 6, 2021  
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.  
United States District Judge

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<sup>2</sup> 28 U.S.C. § 1915 permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. This statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action "is frivolous or malicious," "fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted," or "seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).